![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
PLSC 445B – Québec Politics and Québec-U.S. Relations
Western Washington University
Mid-Term Journal Article Review
Kevyn 'Hagrid' Jacobs
12 May 2008
In this journal article, author David G. Haglund makes the argument that Québec – or more accurately Québec society, rather than the Québec government -– has a “Differential Threat Perception” problem with the United States regarding North American security. Haglund, who is the Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada, argues that Quebecers perceive global and geopolitical threats differently than other North Americans, namely English Canadians and Americans, and examines the sources of these differences. He also makes the case that these differences have implications for North American security, Canada-U.S. relations, and even national unity questions for Canada.
Haglund begins by covering historical attitudes of Quebecers towards the United States. In the 1990s, during the free-trade debates, polls found attitudes in Québec to be very much pro-American – perhaps the most pro-American attitudes in all of Canada.
However, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the United States has taken on an increasingly militaristic and interventionist stance towards the rest of the world, and polls now show a profound shift from pro-American to anti-American attitudes in Québec, most especially since the start of the Iraq war.
Haglund argues that Québec’s mood swings vis-à-vis the U.S. are nothing new. Public opinion in Québec has historically been ambivalent about the powerful neighbour to the south, sometimes supporting, other times opposing American endeavours. Currently, that pendulum is moving towards antipathy.
The author identifies three triggers for this shift in mood: 9/11, French influence, and Québec’s antimilitaristic tradition.
Citing critical geographer Paul Adams, Haglund argues that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked a turning point in Québec opinion of the United States. The initial reaction to 9/11 in Québec was an outpouring of solidarity with the United States, just as it was in the rest of Canada and much of the world. However, as the U.S. attitude following the attacks became militant, Quebecer support of the U.S. began to wane, and attitudes became much more critical of American behaviour.
By the time Canada had joined the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a war which only 36% of Quebecers supported, America’s popularity in Québec had dropped 22% in polls. That support eroded even further when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, as Québec was almost unanimous in its opposition to the invasion. English Canada at the time was split about 50/50 over the invasion, a difference in opinion levels that Haglund illustrates by comparing the numbers of spring 2003 anti-war protesters in Montréal (150,000 – 250,000) with Toronto (10,000 – 30,000). By the Fall of Baghdad, support for the war in English Canada had dropped to two-thirds, but still nowhere near the near-unanimity of Québec opposition.
Continuing to cite Adams, Haglund presents the idea of the “small nation” geopolitical code that Québec worldviews are indelibly shaped by. Having been a subjugated people under the British, and possessing a fiery passion for “la survivance” of their culture, the Québécois feel threatened by America’s “global war on terror,” just like many other small nations.
The second factor increasing Québec’s antipathy toward America is the influence of France. The case can be made that Québec intellectuals and the Québec public are taking cues from French discourse about the “war on terror.” Citing Québec political scientist Louis Belanger, Haglund presents the idea of the language barrier being a cause, with the Québécois being less exposed to U.S. media, and more in touch with French coverage and opinions on international issues.
Haglund illustrates the French influence on anti-American political discourse in Québec with a quote from Université de Montréal political scientist Denis Monière: “Americans have brought the mentality of the Wild West, or the law of the strong, to the practice of international relations. … They mean to impose their way and their ideology on the entire world.” Monière is also quoted as stating that Quebecers are more European than American oriented.
The third factor that Haglund argues is shaping anti-American sentiment in Québec is the province’s longstanding antimilitaristic heritage. Stretching almost all the way back to Confederation, Québec has a long tradition of resisting war mobilizations, especially those in support of England. Historically, this has been a divisive issue for Canada’s national unity, as English Canadians rallied to Great Britain’s side, while the Québécois would often hold back.
In modern times, Québécois antimilitaristic attitudes have played out in the debate about the U.S. missile defence program. This is problematic for Canada-U.S. relations, as Quebecers are much more likely than other Canadians to distrust the Americans. Haglund reveals that there is near-total opposition in Québec to a missile shield.
After explaining the causes of and reasons for the growth of “Québec’s America problem,” Haglund moves on to outline the implications of this attitude, in three areas of interest: Canada-U.S. relations, Canadian national unity, and possible future sovereignty referenda in Québec.
Haglund argues that, though the popular sentiment in Québec may put a strain on Canadian-U.S. relations, it is not likely to topple the strategic alliance the two countries share. Ottawa remains firmly in control of international relations and foreign policy in the areas of security. However, Québec’s voice does play a part in directing the course of Canadian foreign policy.
Two areas where this impact is most directly felt are in Québec’s opposition to a missile shield, and Canada’s reluctance to engage in the Iraq War. It is in the latter that Haglund suggests that the Chrétien government may have not joined the war because of the sentiments of the Québécois electorate’s opposition.
Haglund finishes the U.S.-Canada relations part of the article by pointing out that tensions between Canada and the U.S. could become especially strained if a terrorist attack were to be carried out on the United States from Islamic extremists based in Québec. This nearly happened in 1999 with the Ressam affair, when a plot to bomb the Los Angeles Airport was hatched out of an armed Islamic group in Montréal. Haglund is quick to point out, however, that Ontario is much more likely to be the source if a terrorist attack is ever carried out from Canadian soil.
The author next moves on to the issues of national unity which exist between English Canada and Québec. The story of Canada’s foreign and security policy is demonstrated as having been a long juggling act between Ottawa’s desire to help Great Britain in times of crisis, and the antimilitaristic attitude of the public in Québec. During the Cold War, these tensions eased as Québec sided with Canada, but in the post-Cold War world, these tensions may be reappearing. The fault line runs along the English Canada’s willingness to defer to American leadership, and Québec’s reluctance to do the same. Some of the division comes from the development of the “Anglosphere” in world politics, which is pulling English Canada in a different direction than francophone Québec.
Haglund concludes this argument by stating that this tension between English and French Canada is not as likely to pull Canada apart as in times past, but the prospect of a terrorist operation from Québec could have noteworthy national unity implications.
The third and final implication of anti-American sentiment in Québec is, ironically, internal to the province: Québécois attitudes about America could decide the outcome of future sovereignty referenda by removing one of the Parti Québécois’ (PQ) crucial arguments for national security.
The Parti Québécois, Haglund argues, has never much emphasized the military or security, with both leaders and supporters assuming a status quo in North American strategic relations should Québec become independent. However, Haglund believes the PQ would inexorably find itself being drawn to military power, the closer it drew to sovereignty.
An independent Québec would likely not be allowed to join NATO, because of structural reasons. Nor
would it likely be able to comfortably join NORAD, because of the province’s history of being strongly anti-missile defence. Because of this, and the radically more intense anti-American sentiment since the 1995 referendum, the PQ and sovereignists could no longer make the argument that Québec would be secure as an independent nation. This in itself could jeopardize the success of any future referenda.
Personal Evaluation
Haglund’s arguments in this article fall into four areas of interest: the Differential Threat Perception (DTP) of Québec and the United States, and how this DTP impacts Canada-U.S. relations, Canadian national unity, and future referenda on Québec sovereignty.
It is in the first area that Haglund comes up against his biggest limitation in his study: The misleading choice of the term “Differential Threat Perception” in the title and subject matter. The very term DTP suggests a comparison between the threat perceptions of Quebeckers and Americans that simply doesn’t exist in the work.
Haglund is quick to point out that his choice of concepts was chosen advisedly, as a punning allusion to another concept in international relations theory: “Democratic Peace Theory” (DPT), which posits that security communities between liberal democracies are “idiot proof,” because no matter how badly relations deteriorate between them, there is little or no possibility of armed conflict breaking out between them. Regardless of whether this theory is correct or not, his premise is based upon a clever pun that isn’t entirely descriptive of the contents of his study.
When choosing to title the paper with “Differential … Perceptions,” Haglund implies that the study will be a comparison between Quebecker and American perceptions. This is not the case at all. Haglund is instead only interested in exploring Quebecker and Canadian attitudes towards threat perception after 9/11, and spends almost no time exploring American attitudes. At best, he assumes that the American population’s attitudes mirror those of the U.S. government (a differential he takes pains to point out on the Québec side), and at worst, assumes that attitudes among the American population are indeed markedly different from Quebeckers, without ever actually exploring what those attitudes are. While Haglund provides plenty of anecdotal and referential evidence to illustrate what Québec attitudes are, he does not examine what the American attitudes are.
Nor should he, for this would be outside the scope of the paper, which focuses on Québec, and by extension, Canada. However, Haglund’s choice of titles for the sake of using a clever pun misleads the reader into expecting the study to be something that it is not. As far as weaknesses go, this is not a fatal flaw in the study, but it is an annoyance to those reading it.
Everything else in the paper is fairly strong. Haglund accurately and extensively examines the shift in Québec’s attitudes towards the U.S. after 9/11, and makes a convincing argument that they have had an impact, often negatively, on U.S.-Québec-Canada relations.
Conclusion
Haglund convincingly makes the case in this article that Québec does indeed have a growing “America problem,” one that is defined by anti-American sentiments among the population of Québec. He traces these sentiments to three main factors: the American reaction to 9/11, the influence of France, and Québec’s own antimilitaristic tradition. He then convincingly demonstrates how these attitudes impact North American security, as well as Canada-U.S. relations, and Canadian national unity.
Western Washington University
Mid-Term Journal Article Review
Kevyn 'Hagrid' Jacobs
12 May 2008
Haglund, D. (2006, Winter). Québec's America Problem: Differential Threat
Perception in the North American Security Community. American
Review of Canadian Studies, 36(4), 552-567. Retrieved May 4, 2008, from
Academic Search Complete database.
In this journal article, author David G. Haglund makes the argument that Québec – or more accurately Québec society, rather than the Québec government -– has a “Differential Threat Perception” problem with the United States regarding North American security. Haglund, who is the Sir Edward Peacock Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada, argues that Quebecers perceive global and geopolitical threats differently than other North Americans, namely English Canadians and Americans, and examines the sources of these differences. He also makes the case that these differences have implications for North American security, Canada-U.S. relations, and even national unity questions for Canada.
Haglund begins by covering historical attitudes of Quebecers towards the United States. In the 1990s, during the free-trade debates, polls found attitudes in Québec to be very much pro-American – perhaps the most pro-American attitudes in all of Canada.
However, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the United States has taken on an increasingly militaristic and interventionist stance towards the rest of the world, and polls now show a profound shift from pro-American to anti-American attitudes in Québec, most especially since the start of the Iraq war.
Haglund argues that Québec’s mood swings vis-à-vis the U.S. are nothing new. Public opinion in Québec has historically been ambivalent about the powerful neighbour to the south, sometimes supporting, other times opposing American endeavours. Currently, that pendulum is moving towards antipathy.
The author identifies three triggers for this shift in mood: 9/11, French influence, and Québec’s antimilitaristic tradition.
Citing critical geographer Paul Adams, Haglund argues that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked a turning point in Québec opinion of the United States. The initial reaction to 9/11 in Québec was an outpouring of solidarity with the United States, just as it was in the rest of Canada and much of the world. However, as the U.S. attitude following the attacks became militant, Quebecer support of the U.S. began to wane, and attitudes became much more critical of American behaviour.
By the time Canada had joined the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a war which only 36% of Quebecers supported, America’s popularity in Québec had dropped 22% in polls. That support eroded even further when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, as Québec was almost unanimous in its opposition to the invasion. English Canada at the time was split about 50/50 over the invasion, a difference in opinion levels that Haglund illustrates by comparing the numbers of spring 2003 anti-war protesters in Montréal (150,000 – 250,000) with Toronto (10,000 – 30,000). By the Fall of Baghdad, support for the war in English Canada had dropped to two-thirds, but still nowhere near the near-unanimity of Québec opposition.
Continuing to cite Adams, Haglund presents the idea of the “small nation” geopolitical code that Québec worldviews are indelibly shaped by. Having been a subjugated people under the British, and possessing a fiery passion for “la survivance” of their culture, the Québécois feel threatened by America’s “global war on terror,” just like many other small nations.
The second factor increasing Québec’s antipathy toward America is the influence of France. The case can be made that Québec intellectuals and the Québec public are taking cues from French discourse about the “war on terror.” Citing Québec political scientist Louis Belanger, Haglund presents the idea of the language barrier being a cause, with the Québécois being less exposed to U.S. media, and more in touch with French coverage and opinions on international issues.
Haglund illustrates the French influence on anti-American political discourse in Québec with a quote from Université de Montréal political scientist Denis Monière: “Americans have brought the mentality of the Wild West, or the law of the strong, to the practice of international relations. … They mean to impose their way and their ideology on the entire world.” Monière is also quoted as stating that Quebecers are more European than American oriented.
The third factor that Haglund argues is shaping anti-American sentiment in Québec is the province’s longstanding antimilitaristic heritage. Stretching almost all the way back to Confederation, Québec has a long tradition of resisting war mobilizations, especially those in support of England. Historically, this has been a divisive issue for Canada’s national unity, as English Canadians rallied to Great Britain’s side, while the Québécois would often hold back.
In modern times, Québécois antimilitaristic attitudes have played out in the debate about the U.S. missile defence program. This is problematic for Canada-U.S. relations, as Quebecers are much more likely than other Canadians to distrust the Americans. Haglund reveals that there is near-total opposition in Québec to a missile shield.
After explaining the causes of and reasons for the growth of “Québec’s America problem,” Haglund moves on to outline the implications of this attitude, in three areas of interest: Canada-U.S. relations, Canadian national unity, and possible future sovereignty referenda in Québec.
Haglund argues that, though the popular sentiment in Québec may put a strain on Canadian-U.S. relations, it is not likely to topple the strategic alliance the two countries share. Ottawa remains firmly in control of international relations and foreign policy in the areas of security. However, Québec’s voice does play a part in directing the course of Canadian foreign policy.
Two areas where this impact is most directly felt are in Québec’s opposition to a missile shield, and Canada’s reluctance to engage in the Iraq War. It is in the latter that Haglund suggests that the Chrétien government may have not joined the war because of the sentiments of the Québécois electorate’s opposition.
Haglund finishes the U.S.-Canada relations part of the article by pointing out that tensions between Canada and the U.S. could become especially strained if a terrorist attack were to be carried out on the United States from Islamic extremists based in Québec. This nearly happened in 1999 with the Ressam affair, when a plot to bomb the Los Angeles Airport was hatched out of an armed Islamic group in Montréal. Haglund is quick to point out, however, that Ontario is much more likely to be the source if a terrorist attack is ever carried out from Canadian soil.
The author next moves on to the issues of national unity which exist between English Canada and Québec. The story of Canada’s foreign and security policy is demonstrated as having been a long juggling act between Ottawa’s desire to help Great Britain in times of crisis, and the antimilitaristic attitude of the public in Québec. During the Cold War, these tensions eased as Québec sided with Canada, but in the post-Cold War world, these tensions may be reappearing. The fault line runs along the English Canada’s willingness to defer to American leadership, and Québec’s reluctance to do the same. Some of the division comes from the development of the “Anglosphere” in world politics, which is pulling English Canada in a different direction than francophone Québec.
Haglund concludes this argument by stating that this tension between English and French Canada is not as likely to pull Canada apart as in times past, but the prospect of a terrorist operation from Québec could have noteworthy national unity implications.
The third and final implication of anti-American sentiment in Québec is, ironically, internal to the province: Québécois attitudes about America could decide the outcome of future sovereignty referenda by removing one of the Parti Québécois’ (PQ) crucial arguments for national security.
The Parti Québécois, Haglund argues, has never much emphasized the military or security, with both leaders and supporters assuming a status quo in North American strategic relations should Québec become independent. However, Haglund believes the PQ would inexorably find itself being drawn to military power, the closer it drew to sovereignty.
An independent Québec would likely not be allowed to join NATO, because of structural reasons. Nor
would it likely be able to comfortably join NORAD, because of the province’s history of being strongly anti-missile defence. Because of this, and the radically more intense anti-American sentiment since the 1995 referendum, the PQ and sovereignists could no longer make the argument that Québec would be secure as an independent nation. This in itself could jeopardize the success of any future referenda.
Personal Evaluation
Haglund’s arguments in this article fall into four areas of interest: the Differential Threat Perception (DTP) of Québec and the United States, and how this DTP impacts Canada-U.S. relations, Canadian national unity, and future referenda on Québec sovereignty.
It is in the first area that Haglund comes up against his biggest limitation in his study: The misleading choice of the term “Differential Threat Perception” in the title and subject matter. The very term DTP suggests a comparison between the threat perceptions of Quebeckers and Americans that simply doesn’t exist in the work.
Haglund is quick to point out that his choice of concepts was chosen advisedly, as a punning allusion to another concept in international relations theory: “Democratic Peace Theory” (DPT), which posits that security communities between liberal democracies are “idiot proof,” because no matter how badly relations deteriorate between them, there is little or no possibility of armed conflict breaking out between them. Regardless of whether this theory is correct or not, his premise is based upon a clever pun that isn’t entirely descriptive of the contents of his study.
When choosing to title the paper with “Differential … Perceptions,” Haglund implies that the study will be a comparison between Quebecker and American perceptions. This is not the case at all. Haglund is instead only interested in exploring Quebecker and Canadian attitudes towards threat perception after 9/11, and spends almost no time exploring American attitudes. At best, he assumes that the American population’s attitudes mirror those of the U.S. government (a differential he takes pains to point out on the Québec side), and at worst, assumes that attitudes among the American population are indeed markedly different from Quebeckers, without ever actually exploring what those attitudes are. While Haglund provides plenty of anecdotal and referential evidence to illustrate what Québec attitudes are, he does not examine what the American attitudes are.
Nor should he, for this would be outside the scope of the paper, which focuses on Québec, and by extension, Canada. However, Haglund’s choice of titles for the sake of using a clever pun misleads the reader into expecting the study to be something that it is not. As far as weaknesses go, this is not a fatal flaw in the study, but it is an annoyance to those reading it.
Everything else in the paper is fairly strong. Haglund accurately and extensively examines the shift in Québec’s attitudes towards the U.S. after 9/11, and makes a convincing argument that they have had an impact, often negatively, on U.S.-Québec-Canada relations.
Conclusion
Haglund convincingly makes the case in this article that Québec does indeed have a growing “America problem,” one that is defined by anti-American sentiments among the population of Québec. He traces these sentiments to three main factors: the American reaction to 9/11, the influence of France, and Québec’s own antimilitaristic tradition. He then convincingly demonstrates how these attitudes impact North American security, as well as Canada-U.S. relations, and Canadian national unity.
