Was Québec responsible for Canada's decision
not to participate in the 2003 war in Iraq?
Kevyn Jacobs
PLSC 445B
Québec Politics and
Québec-U.S. Relations
Western Washington University
2008.06.18
=============================================
Introduction
When then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced to Parliament on March 17, 2003, that Canada would not be participating in the invasion of Iraq, he received a standing ovation – and created a diplomatic rift between Canada and the United States[1]. While the majority of English Canada supported the decision, nowhere in Canada was opposition to the war higher than in the francophone province of Québec.[2] Indeed, some conservative critics of Chrétien have charged that the Liberal PM kept Canada out of the war precisely because of the near-unanimous opposition to the invasion in Québec, as a way to shore up Liberal Party support in Québec in looming federal elections in the province.[3] This is probably a fair argument, but to place the entire responsibility for Canada's decision to decline participation on Québec may be a bit hyperbolic, given the strong anti-war sentiment in the rest of the country. In this essay, I shall examine the events leading up to Canada's decision to stay out of the war, how anti-war sentiment in Québec helped shape that decision, and how the federal elections of April 14, 2003 may have played a role in the Chrétien government's decision to sit the invasion out.
I must point out that, as an anglophone American with limited French language comprehension skills, it was unfortunately necessary for me to limit my research for this paper to anglophone sources only. There is much more research to be found in the francophone literature, but it is not accessible to me, and relying on English materials only will no doubt skew my conclusions in the direction of the perspective of English Canadians and anglophone writers.
The Build-up to the Iraq Invasion
The Canadian debate about whether or not to join the United States in attacking Iraq began in the fall of 2002, and continued over the next 6 months. During this period, statements by the Chrétien government about supporting the United States militarily were inconsistent, at times favouring the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, and at others, suggesting that Canada did not support a unilateral invasion.[4]
This equivocation was reflective of the overall ambivalence of the Canadian people during this period. Québec, which makes up fully 23% of the population of Canada[5], was almost unanimous in its opposition to the Iraq war. English Canada was split fifty-fifty on the question, and opposition rose substantially there after the invasion[6]. This means that half of Canadians, and over time rising into a majority, opposed the war. This kind of pressure the Chrétien government could hardly ignore. As the war loomed and the debate raged across Canada, the federal government walked a tightrope between not antagonizing their American neighbours to the south, and not antagonizing the growing anti-war sentiment in Canada, and especially, in Québec.
In the period between 9/11 and the Iraq invasion, Canada cooperated extensively with the United States in the so-called “Global War On Terror.” Canada and the U.S. signed a border security agreement in December 2001, the “Smart Border Declaration,” which improved border security and infrastructure between the two governments.[7] Canada shared intelligence about terrorism suspects with the U.S., sometimes erroneously, most notoriously in the case of Canadian citizen Maher Arar, who was shipped off to Syria by the U.S. in 2002 and tortured based on faulty intelligence supplied by the RCMP.[8] And most notably, Canada continues to be a major participant in the Afghanistan war and occupation.
But uncritical Canadian cooperation with the U.S. reached an end on March 17, 2003, when Chrétien made the announcement that Canada would not participate in the Iraq war, just days before the invasion. That the United States was going to go ahead with the invasion, based on the authority of United Nations Security Council resolution 1441, was clear. This resolution declared Iraq to be in “material breach” of previous resolutions, and threatened “serious consequences” if Iraq did not comply with U.N. weapons inspections. Canada, however, stated unequivocally that resolution 1441 was not enough to authorize war, and would not participate in the invasion without a new Security Council resolution.[9]
Anti-War Sentiment in Québec
At the time of the invasion of Iraq, the population of Québec was almost unanimous in its opposition to the invasion. This sentiment can be most dramatically illustrated in the sheer size of antiwar demonstrations in Montréal in February 2003. Between 150,000 and 200,000 demonstrators took to the streets, the largest outpouring of anti-war sentiment in North America. In contrast, comparable demonstrations in Toronto only drew between 10,000 and 30,000 protesters.[10]
Québec's anti-war sentiment is not a new phenomena. There is a long history of opposing armed military conflict in the province, dating back well over a century. Beginning with the Boer War in the late 1800s, and running through much of the 20th century, Canada's participation in foreign military expeditions has usually faced opposition in Québec. More recently, in the run-up to the Afghan war in late 2001, only 36% of Quebecers supported Canada's participation.[11]
The roots of the Québec tradition of opposing wars were outlined by political scientist David Haglund in a 2006 paper he wrote for the American Review of Canadian Studies. Drawing upon the work of critical geographer Paul Adams, Haglund demonstrates that Québécois' worldviews are fundamentally shaped by a “small-nation geopolitical code,” one which was born of Québec's history as a land and people subjugated by a large empire, a people in whom “la survivance” of culture against large foes is a core value, and one which ultimately leads it to side with smaller nations in armed conflicts. Furthermore, Québec has strong linguistic and cultural connections to France, which has strongly opposed the United States' actions in Iraq, and it is likely that the anti-war rhetoric in the French-language media has shaped the Québécois anti-American sentiment in recent years. And, Québec also has a history of opposing U.S.-led defensive measures, such as the creation of a North American missile defense shield.[12]
Each of these factors help to explain Québec's opposition to the Iraq War, and in turn, shaped Canada's foreign policy decisions in the conflict, through the presence of Québécois in the federal government in Ottawa. When 23% of your country adamantly opposes something, it's hard to argue that this opposition carries no sway at the federal level.
Chrétien and the 2003 Québec provincial elections
At the very moment in early 2003 that Canada was debating participating in the Iraq War, Québec was getting ready to hold general elections. Five days before Chrétien's announcement that Canada would not invade, Québec Premier Bernard Landry called for the dissolution of the Québec National Assembly, and for general elections to be conducted in Québec, which were ultimately held on April 14th. [13] The coincidental timing of the elections may have, in part, swayed the course of Canadian foreign policy.
At stake in the elections was the control of the Québec government by the sovereignist Parti Québécois, which had held power in the province since 1994. Polls indicated that the Parti libéral du Québec had a strong chance of winning the elections, and Chrétien, a Liberal himself, no doubt recognized this. However, when it came to the issue of the war, all parties in the election agreed it was a bad idea. All three candidates in the election even wore anti-war ribbons during the televised debate, demonstrating the unanimity of anti-war sentiment in the province [14]. If the Liberal government in Ottawa had chosen to join in the war during the campaign, it is quite likely that the close election may have swung in favour of the PQ, instead of the PLQ, who ultimately won control of the government. [15]
Conclusion
There is little doubt that Canada's decision not to participate in the Iraq War influenced the outcome of the April 2003 provincial elections in Québec. Anti-war sentiment in the province was running high, and all candidates in the election expressed a strong anti-war position. Were the federal Liberals of the Chrétien government in Ottawa to have sent Canada to join in the invasion, the election would have taken place against the backdrop of Canadian forces fighting in Iraq. Because of Québec's longstanding tradition of opposing wars, sentiment in the province would have no doubt turned against the PLQ, handing the election to the PQ. By choosing not to invade, the Chrétien government avoided antagonizing the anti-war electorate in Québec, an action which conceivably could have driven many voters into the PQ column instead of the PLQ. It is likely that the Chrétien government recognized this fact in making its deliberations about Iraq, and that it did indeed influence Canada's decision to stay out of the war.
It is also fair to speculate about whether or not the Landry government in Québec chose to call the elections at the time of the build-up to the Iraq war for this very reason, hoping to use the anti-war sentiment of the province as a way to swing the election. The PQ may have been expecting the federal Liberals to join the United States in invading Iraq, weakening Liberal support among the Québec electorate. If this is so, then this decision backfired when Chrétien declared that Canada would have no part in the war.
But what is central to all of this is the question, “was Québec responsible for Canada's decision to stay out of Iraq?” To this question, I must answer yes, partially, given the anti-war sentiment in the province, and the calculations of the Chrétien government in making this choice. However, it seems dubious that the Chrétien government would have deliberately chosen a course of action that antagonized its powerful neighbour to the south without broad support across Canada. Chrétien could not have made the decision to abstain without substantial support from English Canada, which was beginning to oppose the war in growing numbers. It seems likely that Chrétien recognized that the war was becoming increasingly unpopular in English Canada, and saw that opposition would only increase as the war went on, which is exactly what happened. [16] If English Canada had supported the war more strongly than it did, the Chrétien government would not have been able to keep Canada at home. Responsibility for the decision to stay out of Iraq must also partially rest with English Canada, and not just the Québécois.
References
1. McCarthy, S. (2003, 18 March). Ottawa: PM rejects war without the UN. The Globe and Mail, A.1. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 1059266381).
2. Galloway, G. (2003, 22 March). PM's Iraq call backed by 66%, poll reveals. The Globe and Mail, A.15. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 1059836211).
3. Cooper, B. and Morton, T. (2003, March 28). Chretien has put party ahead of country [National Edition]. National Post, p. A16. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 321304661).
4. Richter, A. (Autumn 2005). From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbor: Canada-US. Relations in a Changing Global Environment. American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 35, Issue 3. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from Academic Search Complete database.
5. Statistics Canada (2007, June 28). Canada's Population Estimates. Statistics Canada's The Daily, http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/070628/d070628c.htm . Retrieved June 17, 2008 from the Statistics Canada website.
6. Haglund, D. (2006, Winter). Québec's America Problem: Differential Threat Perception in the North American Security Community. American Review of Canadian Studies, 36(4), 552-567. Retrieved June 1, 2008, from Academic Search Complete database.
7. Barry, D. (2005, Summer). Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq. American Review of Canadian Studies, 35(2). Retrieved June 17, 2008, from Academic Search Complete database.
8. Alberts, S. (2008, June 6). Arar deported despite torture concerns. The Montreal Gazette, p. A14. Retrieved June 17, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 1491795781).
9. Barry, (2005).
10. Haglund (2006).
11. Haglund (2006).
12. Haglund (2006).
13. QuebecPolitique.com (2003). Élection générale 2003, http://www.quebecpolitique.com/2003/ . Retrieved June 18, 2008.
14. Granatstein, J. (2005, Nov. 1). Quebecers are at the helm, The Ottawa Citizen, p. A 15. Retrieved June 17, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 920620271).
15. Thomas, G. (2003, April 14). The Liberals need votes in Trois-Rivieres more than in Baghdad, The Vancouver Sun, p. A15. Retrieved June 18, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 388289161).
16. Haglund (2006).
not to participate in the 2003 war in Iraq?
Kevyn Jacobs
PLSC 445B
Québec Politics and
Québec-U.S. Relations
Western Washington University
2008.06.18
=============================================
Introduction
When then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced to Parliament on March 17, 2003, that Canada would not be participating in the invasion of Iraq, he received a standing ovation – and created a diplomatic rift between Canada and the United States[1]. While the majority of English Canada supported the decision, nowhere in Canada was opposition to the war higher than in the francophone province of Québec.[2] Indeed, some conservative critics of Chrétien have charged that the Liberal PM kept Canada out of the war precisely because of the near-unanimous opposition to the invasion in Québec, as a way to shore up Liberal Party support in Québec in looming federal elections in the province.[3] This is probably a fair argument, but to place the entire responsibility for Canada's decision to decline participation on Québec may be a bit hyperbolic, given the strong anti-war sentiment in the rest of the country. In this essay, I shall examine the events leading up to Canada's decision to stay out of the war, how anti-war sentiment in Québec helped shape that decision, and how the federal elections of April 14, 2003 may have played a role in the Chrétien government's decision to sit the invasion out.
I must point out that, as an anglophone American with limited French language comprehension skills, it was unfortunately necessary for me to limit my research for this paper to anglophone sources only. There is much more research to be found in the francophone literature, but it is not accessible to me, and relying on English materials only will no doubt skew my conclusions in the direction of the perspective of English Canadians and anglophone writers.
The Build-up to the Iraq Invasion
The Canadian debate about whether or not to join the United States in attacking Iraq began in the fall of 2002, and continued over the next 6 months. During this period, statements by the Chrétien government about supporting the United States militarily were inconsistent, at times favouring the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, and at others, suggesting that Canada did not support a unilateral invasion.[4]
This equivocation was reflective of the overall ambivalence of the Canadian people during this period. Québec, which makes up fully 23% of the population of Canada[5], was almost unanimous in its opposition to the Iraq war. English Canada was split fifty-fifty on the question, and opposition rose substantially there after the invasion[6]. This means that half of Canadians, and over time rising into a majority, opposed the war. This kind of pressure the Chrétien government could hardly ignore. As the war loomed and the debate raged across Canada, the federal government walked a tightrope between not antagonizing their American neighbours to the south, and not antagonizing the growing anti-war sentiment in Canada, and especially, in Québec.
In the period between 9/11 and the Iraq invasion, Canada cooperated extensively with the United States in the so-called “Global War On Terror.” Canada and the U.S. signed a border security agreement in December 2001, the “Smart Border Declaration,” which improved border security and infrastructure between the two governments.[7] Canada shared intelligence about terrorism suspects with the U.S., sometimes erroneously, most notoriously in the case of Canadian citizen Maher Arar, who was shipped off to Syria by the U.S. in 2002 and tortured based on faulty intelligence supplied by the RCMP.[8] And most notably, Canada continues to be a major participant in the Afghanistan war and occupation.
But uncritical Canadian cooperation with the U.S. reached an end on March 17, 2003, when Chrétien made the announcement that Canada would not participate in the Iraq war, just days before the invasion. That the United States was going to go ahead with the invasion, based on the authority of United Nations Security Council resolution 1441, was clear. This resolution declared Iraq to be in “material breach” of previous resolutions, and threatened “serious consequences” if Iraq did not comply with U.N. weapons inspections. Canada, however, stated unequivocally that resolution 1441 was not enough to authorize war, and would not participate in the invasion without a new Security Council resolution.[9]
Anti-War Sentiment in Québec
At the time of the invasion of Iraq, the population of Québec was almost unanimous in its opposition to the invasion. This sentiment can be most dramatically illustrated in the sheer size of antiwar demonstrations in Montréal in February 2003. Between 150,000 and 200,000 demonstrators took to the streets, the largest outpouring of anti-war sentiment in North America. In contrast, comparable demonstrations in Toronto only drew between 10,000 and 30,000 protesters.[10]
Québec's anti-war sentiment is not a new phenomena. There is a long history of opposing armed military conflict in the province, dating back well over a century. Beginning with the Boer War in the late 1800s, and running through much of the 20th century, Canada's participation in foreign military expeditions has usually faced opposition in Québec. More recently, in the run-up to the Afghan war in late 2001, only 36% of Quebecers supported Canada's participation.[11]
The roots of the Québec tradition of opposing wars were outlined by political scientist David Haglund in a 2006 paper he wrote for the American Review of Canadian Studies. Drawing upon the work of critical geographer Paul Adams, Haglund demonstrates that Québécois' worldviews are fundamentally shaped by a “small-nation geopolitical code,” one which was born of Québec's history as a land and people subjugated by a large empire, a people in whom “la survivance” of culture against large foes is a core value, and one which ultimately leads it to side with smaller nations in armed conflicts. Furthermore, Québec has strong linguistic and cultural connections to France, which has strongly opposed the United States' actions in Iraq, and it is likely that the anti-war rhetoric in the French-language media has shaped the Québécois anti-American sentiment in recent years. And, Québec also has a history of opposing U.S.-led defensive measures, such as the creation of a North American missile defense shield.[12]
Each of these factors help to explain Québec's opposition to the Iraq War, and in turn, shaped Canada's foreign policy decisions in the conflict, through the presence of Québécois in the federal government in Ottawa. When 23% of your country adamantly opposes something, it's hard to argue that this opposition carries no sway at the federal level.
Chrétien and the 2003 Québec provincial elections
At the very moment in early 2003 that Canada was debating participating in the Iraq War, Québec was getting ready to hold general elections. Five days before Chrétien's announcement that Canada would not invade, Québec Premier Bernard Landry called for the dissolution of the Québec National Assembly, and for general elections to be conducted in Québec, which were ultimately held on April 14th. [13] The coincidental timing of the elections may have, in part, swayed the course of Canadian foreign policy.
At stake in the elections was the control of the Québec government by the sovereignist Parti Québécois, which had held power in the province since 1994. Polls indicated that the Parti libéral du Québec had a strong chance of winning the elections, and Chrétien, a Liberal himself, no doubt recognized this. However, when it came to the issue of the war, all parties in the election agreed it was a bad idea. All three candidates in the election even wore anti-war ribbons during the televised debate, demonstrating the unanimity of anti-war sentiment in the province [14]. If the Liberal government in Ottawa had chosen to join in the war during the campaign, it is quite likely that the close election may have swung in favour of the PQ, instead of the PLQ, who ultimately won control of the government. [15]
Conclusion
There is little doubt that Canada's decision not to participate in the Iraq War influenced the outcome of the April 2003 provincial elections in Québec. Anti-war sentiment in the province was running high, and all candidates in the election expressed a strong anti-war position. Were the federal Liberals of the Chrétien government in Ottawa to have sent Canada to join in the invasion, the election would have taken place against the backdrop of Canadian forces fighting in Iraq. Because of Québec's longstanding tradition of opposing wars, sentiment in the province would have no doubt turned against the PLQ, handing the election to the PQ. By choosing not to invade, the Chrétien government avoided antagonizing the anti-war electorate in Québec, an action which conceivably could have driven many voters into the PQ column instead of the PLQ. It is likely that the Chrétien government recognized this fact in making its deliberations about Iraq, and that it did indeed influence Canada's decision to stay out of the war.
It is also fair to speculate about whether or not the Landry government in Québec chose to call the elections at the time of the build-up to the Iraq war for this very reason, hoping to use the anti-war sentiment of the province as a way to swing the election. The PQ may have been expecting the federal Liberals to join the United States in invading Iraq, weakening Liberal support among the Québec electorate. If this is so, then this decision backfired when Chrétien declared that Canada would have no part in the war.
But what is central to all of this is the question, “was Québec responsible for Canada's decision to stay out of Iraq?” To this question, I must answer yes, partially, given the anti-war sentiment in the province, and the calculations of the Chrétien government in making this choice. However, it seems dubious that the Chrétien government would have deliberately chosen a course of action that antagonized its powerful neighbour to the south without broad support across Canada. Chrétien could not have made the decision to abstain without substantial support from English Canada, which was beginning to oppose the war in growing numbers. It seems likely that Chrétien recognized that the war was becoming increasingly unpopular in English Canada, and saw that opposition would only increase as the war went on, which is exactly what happened. [16] If English Canada had supported the war more strongly than it did, the Chrétien government would not have been able to keep Canada at home. Responsibility for the decision to stay out of Iraq must also partially rest with English Canada, and not just the Québécois.
References
1. McCarthy, S. (2003, 18 March). Ottawa: PM rejects war without the UN. The Globe and Mail, A.1. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 1059266381).
2. Galloway, G. (2003, 22 March). PM's Iraq call backed by 66%, poll reveals. The Globe and Mail, A.15. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 1059836211).
3. Cooper, B. and Morton, T. (2003, March 28). Chretien has put party ahead of country [National Edition]. National Post, p. A16. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 321304661).
4. Richter, A. (Autumn 2005). From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbor: Canada-US. Relations in a Changing Global Environment. American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 35, Issue 3. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from Academic Search Complete database.
5. Statistics Canada (2007, June 28). Canada's Population Estimates. Statistics Canada's The Daily, http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/070628/d070628c.htm . Retrieved June 17, 2008 from the Statistics Canada website.
6. Haglund, D. (2006, Winter). Québec's America Problem: Differential Threat Perception in the North American Security Community. American Review of Canadian Studies, 36(4), 552-567. Retrieved June 1, 2008, from Academic Search Complete database.
7. Barry, D. (2005, Summer). Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq. American Review of Canadian Studies, 35(2). Retrieved June 17, 2008, from Academic Search Complete database.
8. Alberts, S. (2008, June 6). Arar deported despite torture concerns. The Montreal Gazette, p. A14. Retrieved June 17, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 1491795781).
9. Barry, (2005).
10. Haglund (2006).
11. Haglund (2006).
12. Haglund (2006).
13. QuebecPolitique.com (2003). Élection générale 2003, http://www.quebecpolitique.com/2003/ . Retrieved June 18, 2008.
14. Granatstein, J. (2005, Nov. 1). Quebecers are at the helm, The Ottawa Citizen, p. A 15. Retrieved June 17, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 920620271).
15. Thomas, G. (2003, April 14). The Liberals need votes in Trois-Rivieres more than in Baghdad, The Vancouver Sun, p. A15. Retrieved June 18, 2008, from ProQuest Newsstand database. (Document ID: 388289161).
16. Haglund (2006).
From:
Hagrid for the WIN!
From:
Re: Hagrid for the WIN!
From: (Anonymous)
I should say
From:
Re: I should say